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Before: SHWARTZ, SCIRICA, and RENDELL,  
Circuit Judges.   
 
(Filed: April 14, 2020) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
Stephen R. Cerutti, II 
Carlo D. Marchioli  [ARGUED] 
Office of the United States Attorney  
228 Walnut Street, P.O. Box 11754 
220 Federal Building and Courthouse  
Harrisburg, PA 17108 
 
 Counsel for United States of America 
 
Ronald A. Krauss 
Quin M. Sorenson  [ARGUED] 
Office of the Federal Public Defender 
100 Chestnut Street 
Suite 306 
Harrisburg, PA 17101 
 
 Counsel for Willie Tyler 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.   
Doreen Proctor reported drug activity in her 
neighborhood and decided to cooperate with law enforcement.  
3 
She was murdered.  Willie Tyler was charged in state court 
with her murder.  He was acquitted.    
A federal grand jury thereafter charged Tyler with, 
among other things, witness tampering by murder, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C),1 and witness tampering by 
intimidation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3).2  Tyler has 
been tried three times on these charges.3  Each jury returned a 
 
1 Section 1512(a)(1)(C) makes it a crime to “kill[] or 
attempt[] to kill another person, with intent to . . . prevent the 
communication by any person to a law enforcement officer . . . 
of information relating to the commission or possible 
commission of a Federal offense.” 
2 Section 1512(b)(3) makes it a crime to “knowingly 
use[] intimidation, threaten[], or corruptly persuade[] another 
person, or attempt[] to do so, or engage[] in misleading conduct 
toward another person, with intent to . . . hinder, delay, or 
prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer . . . of 
information relating to the commission or possible commission 
of a Federal offense.” 
3 Tyler’s first conviction was vacated on constitutional 
grounds.  See United States v. Tyler (Tyler I), 164 F.3d 150, 
151 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. Tyler, No. 1:CR-96-106, 
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21891 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 2000).  He 
was retried and convicted of two counts of witness tampering 
by murder and intimidation and one count of using and 
carrying a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and we affirmed the 
convictions on direct appeal.  United States v. Tyler (Tyler II), 
281 F.3d 84, 89, 101 (3d Cir. 2002).  Tyler collaterally attacked 
this second jury’s witness tampering verdicts based upon a 
change in the law, and we directed the District Court to hold a 
hearing on whether Tyler was now actually innocent of these 
4 
guilty verdict.  The first two verdicts were overturned due to 
legal errors.  The District Court set aside the third jury’s guilty 
verdict pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, 
concluding that there was insufficient evidence for a 
reasonable juror to conclude that Tyler had the intent to murder 
or intimidate Proctor to prevent her from communicating with 
a qualifying officer.   
 
Because (1) the District Court erred in ruling that 
Fowler v. United States, 563 U.S. 668 (2011), applies only to 
situations where a defendant does not know the identity of a 
specific law enforcement officer to whom the witness would 
have communicated; and (2) there was sufficient evidence 
upon which a rational juror could conclude that (a) Tyler acted 
with intent to prevent Proctor from communicating with law 
enforcement, and (b) there was a “reasonable likelihood” that 
she would have communicated with a qualifying law 
enforcement officer had she not been murdered, we will 
reverse and direct the District Court to reinstate the verdict and 
proceed to sentencing.     
 
 
crimes.  United States v. Tyler (Tyler III), 732 F.3d 241, 243, 
252-53 (3d Cir. 2013).  On remand, the District Court held that 
Tyler had established actual innocence of witness tampering 
with intent to interfere with an official proceeding but not of 
witness tampering with intent to prevent communication with 
a law enforcement officer.  United States v. Tyler, 35 F. Supp. 
3d 650, 653-54 (M.D. Pa. 2014).  Based upon this ruling, and 
consistent with our instructions, see Tyler III, 732 F.3d at 253, 
the District Court conducted a third trial on the witness 
tampering to prevent a law enforcement communication 
charges.   
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I 
 
A 
 
Proctor was a confidential informant for the Tri County 
Task Force (“Task Force”), which focused on drug crimes and 
was staffed with law enforcement officers from Pennsylvania’s 
Cumberland, York, and Perry Counties.  Agent Ronald Diller 
of the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s Office coordinated the 
Task Force’s activities.  Detective David Fones, a Carlisle 
Police Officer, was a Task Force member.    
 
The Task Force frequently worked with federal 
agencies, including the Drug Enforcement Administration 
(“DEA”).  Agent Diller met with the DEA multiple times a 
month, or more frequently as needed, to discuss the DEA’s 
interest in the Task Force’s cases.  If the DEA adopted a Task 
Force case, Agent Diller often became a co-case agent and had 
been deputized to handle specific cases.  In any given year, 
Agent Diller referred between five and ten cases to the DEA.  
  
DEA Special Agent David Keith Humphreys was the 
DEA’s liaison to the Task Force and had regular contact with 
Agent Diller.  Special Agent Humphreys testified that if Agent 
Diller approached him with information from a confidential 
informant, it “would be required almost” for Special Agent 
Humphreys to interview that informant.  App. 670.     
 
From 1984 to 1996, 65% of the 246 investigations that 
the Harrisburg, Pennsylvania DEA office initiated were jointly 
worked with state and local law enforcement.    
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B 
 
In 1990, Proctor called a drug hotline in Carlisle, 
Pennsylvania to express concern about drug trafficking in her 
neighborhood.  After speaking with Detective Fones, Proctor 
began working as a confidential informant for the Task Force.  
As a confidential informant, Proctor provided information, 
made controlled purchases, and testified in court.  Specifically, 
Proctor made three controlled purchases of cocaine in Carlisle, 
leading to the arrests of four individuals, including David Tyler 
(“David T.”), Tyler’s brother, and Mary Jane Hodge, a woman 
with whom Tyler and his brother resided.  All four were 
charged in state court, and Proctor testified at their preliminary 
hearings.  Proctor also testified at Hodge’s state jury trial.  At 
Hodge’s January 1992 trial, Proctor testified that she was “out 
of this business now,” App. 118, which meant that she was no 
longer making covert drug purchases. 
 
Proctor nonetheless continued to provide information 
about illegal drug activity to Detective Fones and Agent Diller.  
Among other things, over the course of the investigation, 
Proctor told Detective Fones that David T.’s cocaine supplier 
was in New York City and that David T. made trips to Jamaica.  
Detective Fones relayed this out-of-state drug activity to Agent 
Diller so that they could determine how to proceed.4  This 
 
4 Agent Diller had frequent contact with Proctor.  He 
met with her ten to fifteen times and used the information that 
she provided to obtain permission to record her interactions 
with suspected drug dealers.  Agent Diller was also present for 
her controlled purchases, and debriefed her before and after 
each controlled buy, in part to determine whether she had 
7 
information, however, was not conveyed to the DEA before 
Proctor’s death, and Special Agent Humphreys had not heard 
Proctor’s name before her murder.      
 
C 
 
Proctor was murdered in the early morning hours of 
April 21, 1992, the day she was scheduled to testify at David 
T.’s trial.5  The following events preceded her murder.  On the 
day before Proctor was set to testify, Tyler was driving with 
David T. and Gwanda Campbell, a friend of Hodge’s.  
Campbell testified that she knew Tyler because she “used to 
get high with him.”  App. 484.  While they were driving, Tyler 
and David T. spotted Proctor and said that they “were going to 
do something to her then, but there were too many cars.”  App. 
490.  Campbell, Tyler, and David T. then drove to Hodge’s 
house, where David T. and Tyler were living.  There, David T. 
retrieved a gun and Tyler showed him how to cock it.   
 
Early the next morning, Roberta Bell (David T.’s 
girlfriend) lured Proctor from her house by offering her 
cocaine.  Eventually, Bell convinced Proctor to take a ride in 
Bell’s car.  David T. and Tyler were in a separate car.  Bell and 
Tyler eventually pulled their cars over, and Bell exited her car, 
approached the Tylers, and told them, “I have her.”  App. 719.  
In a 1993 letter Tyler wrote, Tyler stated that he asked David 
T. what was going on, and David T. told Tyler that Bell “had a 
surprise for him.”  App. 719.  Tyler claims that he then “hear[d] 
a shot.”  App. 719.    
 
obtained information concerning the sources of the drugs she 
purchased.       
5 Proctor was also scheduled to testify at two other trials.   
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Proctor’s body was found on the side of a rural road.  
She had been beaten, shot in the chest, and then shot in the head 
while on the ground.  After the murder, Tyler returned to 
Hodge’s house and said, “[t]he bitch is gone” or “she’s gone.”  
App. 507, 514.  Later that morning, David T. came to the house 
dressed for court and said, “I’ll be at court and that bitch 
won’t.”  App. 507.   
 
Laura Barrett, who stayed with Bell’s children while 
Bell was with the Tylers the night of the murder, said that Bell 
returned home carrying bloody clothes and told Barrett that, if 
anyone asked, Barrett should say Bell was home all night.  
Barrett testified that sometime later, Tyler, Bell, and David T. 
were at Bell’s house arguing about drugs.  She heard the three 
of them discussing that David T. gave Tyler drugs that were 
supposed to be given to Jerome King, Bell’s uncle.  During this 
argument, Barrett heard Bell say to Tyler that she (Bell) shot 
Proctor, but that “you killed her.”  App. 935.  Tyler responded 
“You don’t know who’s listening.  You don’t know who hears 
this.”  App. 935.  Tyler then said, “I’m leaving,” and left.  App. 
935.6  Hodge testified that Proctor was killed because she was 
set to testify against David T.   
 
6 Ola Woods, the mother of David T.’s children, said 
that sometime after the murder, Bell asked her to tell David T. 
that “[Bell] and her uncles,” David and Jerome King, who were 
also present at Proctor’s murder, “have their story together, and 
if worst comes to worst, to put it on Little Man,” a reference to 
Tyler.  App. 660.  
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D 
Based upon this evidence, the jury found Tyler guilty 
on both witness tampering counts.7  The District Court granted 
Tyler’s post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal under Rule 
29.  The Court held that: (1) the evidence supported a finding 
that Tyler was guilty of murder under accomplice liability, 
United States v. Tyler, Case No. 1:96-cr-106, 2018 WL 
10322201, at *6-7 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2018); (2) the evidence 
supported a finding that Proctor was murdered to prevent her 
from testifying at David T.’s trial but did not support a finding 
that Tyler acted with intent to prevent an investigation-related 
communication, id. at *10; (3) although the evidence 
supported a finding that any communication concerned the 
possible commission of a federal offense, id. at *11, the 
“reasonable likelihood” standard set forth in Fowler, 563 U.S. 
at 677, for determining whether such a communication would 
be made to a federal officer did not apply because it was known 
that Proctor served as an informant for Detective Fones, so any 
act of witness intimidation was directed at preventing a 
communication to a specific known person, Tyler, 2018 WL 
10322201, at *13-14, and the Fowler standard only applies 
when the defendant did not have in mind “some specific law 
 
7 Because we vacated, and Tyler was only retried on, the 
witness tampering counts, his conviction following the second 
trial for using and carrying a firearm during a crime of 
violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), was left undisturbed.  Tyler has 
cross-appealed his conviction for that crime, contending that 
his conviction under § 924(c) following his second trial should 
be reversed because the Rule 29 order overturned the predicate 
crime of violence in which he allegedly used a firearm.  We 
will discuss the merits of that appeal infra note 17.   
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enforcement officer or set of officers,” id. at *12 (emphasis 
omitted), with whom the witness would communicate; and (4) 
the Government did not introduce any evidence from which a 
rational trier of fact could conclude that Detective Fones was a 
federal law enforcement officer, id. at *14.   
 
The Government appeals the District Court’s Rule 29 
order.   
 
II8 
 
A 
 
We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s 
order granting a motion for judgment of acquittal based on the 
sufficiency of the evidence, United States v. Willis, 844 F.3d 
155, 164 n.21 (3d Cir. 2016), and apply the same standard as 
the district court, United States v. Freeman, 763 F.3d 322, 343 
(3d Cir. 2014).  This standard requires that we view the 
evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution” to 
determine whether a “rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime[s] beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).  This review is 
“highly deferential” to the factual findings of the jury, and we 
“must be ever vigilant . . . not to usurp the role of the jury by 
weighing credibility and assigning weight to the evidence, or 
by substituting [our] judgment for that of the jury.” United 
States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 
 
8 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
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2013) (en banc) (alteration and omission in original) (quoting 
United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 133 (3d Cir. 2005)).   
 
Thus, even if the evidence adduced is consistent  
with multiple possibilities, our role as a 
reviewing court is to uphold the jury verdict . . . 
as long as it passes the bare rationality test.  
Reversing the jury’s conclusion simply because 
another inference is possible—or even equally 
plausible—is inconsistent with the proper 
inquiry for review of sufficiency of the evidence 
challenges, which is that [t]he evidence does not 
need to be inconsistent with every conclusion 
save that of guilt if it does establish a case from 
which the jury can find the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  It is up to the jury—
not the district court judge or our Court—to 
examine the evidence and draw inferences.  
Unless the jury’s conclusion is irrational, it must 
be upheld. 
 
Id. at 433 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).   
 
Considering the evidence under this highly deferential 
standard, we conclude that the evidence supported each 
element of the offenses charged, that “the jury’s verdict did not 
fall below the threshold of bare rationality,” and that the verdict 
“should therefore be reinstated.”  Id. at 432-33 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  We examine the 
evidence supporting each element in turn. 
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B 
 
The Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1512-1515, 3663-3664, “was enacted to provide 
protection to witnesses in federal cases,” Tyler III, 732 F.3d 
241, 247 (3d Cir. 2013), and prohibits witness tampering by 
murder and by threats or intimidation.  To prove witness 
tampering by murder, the Government must demonstrate that:  
 
(1) “the defendant killed or attempted to kill a person”;  
(2) “the defendant was motivated by a desire to prevent 
the communication between any person and law 
enforcement authorities concerning the commission or 
possible commission of an offense”;  
(3) “that offense was actually a federal offense”; and  
(4) “a reasonable likelihood that the person whom the 
defendant believes may communicate with law 
enforcement would in fact make a relevant 
communication with a federal law enforcement 
officer.”  
Bruce v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 868 F.3d 170, 184 (3d Cir. 
2017) (emphasis omitted) (citing Tyler III, 732 F.3d at 252).  
Witness tampering by intimidation requires proof of the same 
elements as witness tampering by murder, except that the first 
element instead requires evidence that the defendant 
intimidated, threatened, or corruptly persuaded the witness.  
See § 1512(b)(3). 
 
 Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
Government, a rational juror could have concluded that the 
13 
evidence supported each element of the offenses charged 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus the District Court erred by 
entering a judgment of acquittal.   
 
1 
 
As to the first element, we must determine whether the 
evidence supports a finding that Tyler murdered or aided and 
abetted Proctor’s murder.  Section 1512 incorporates the 
definition of murder in 18 U.S.C. § 1111, which requires proof 
that Tyler: (1) unlawfully killed Proctor, (2) with malice 
aforethought, and (3) with premeditation.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1111(a).  For the jury to have found Tyler guilty of murder 
based on aiding and abetting, the Government had to prove 
that: (a) someone murdered Proctor, (b) Tyler knew the murder 
would be committed or was being committed by this actor, 
(c) Tyler knowingly performed an act for the purpose of aiding, 
assisting, soliciting, facilitating, or encouraging the actor and 
with the intent that the actor commit the murder, and (d) Tyler 
performed an act in furtherance of the murder.  See United 
States v. Nolan, 718 F.2d 589, 592 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 
The evidence provided a basis for a rational juror to 
conclude that Tyler murdered  Proctor or aided and abetted her 
murder.  The night before Proctor was scheduled to testify at 
David T.’s trial, Tyler and David T. spotted Proctor on the 
street but declined to do anything to her only because there 
“were too many cars” around.  App. 490.  Tyler and David T. 
thereafter went to the back of Hodge’s house where David T. 
retrieved a gun and asked Tyler if Tyler knew how to cock it.  
Tyler said he did and showed David T. how to cock the gun.  
Hours later, Tyler drove David T. to the murder scene.  
Afterwards, Tyler told Campbell “[t]he bitch is gone,” or 
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“she’s gone.”  App. 507, 514.  In discussing the murder, Bell 
said to Tyler, “I shot Doreen but you killed her,” and Tyler 
responded, “You don’t know who’s listening.  You don’t know 
who hears this.”  App. 935.  Proctor’s autopsy confirmed that 
she was shot multiple times, with a shot to her body, followed 
by a shot to her head after she was lying on the ground.  This 
evidence provided a basis for a rational juror to conclude that 
Tyler knew about a desire to harm Proctor, knew how to use a 
gun, drove with his brother to the murder scene, and played a 
role in her murder.  In short, a rational juror had a sufficient 
basis to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Tyler killed 
Proctor or aided and abetted her murder.9  
 
2 
 
Sufficient evidence also establishes that Tyler killed or 
intimidated Proctor, at least in part, with the intent to prevent 
her communication with law enforcement.  On direct appeal 
from accomplice Roberta Bell’s conviction, we previously 
considered whether a reasonable juror could infer, from the 
facts adduced in Bell’s case, an intent to hinder Proctor’s future 
communication with law enforcement.  Our Court considered 
and rejected the argument, accepted by the District Court here, 
that the only permissible inference was that Bell acted solely 
to prevent Proctor from testifying at David T’s trial.  United 
States v. Bell, 113 F.3d 1345, 1350 (3d Cir. 1997).  Of course, 
 
9 Tyler did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 
on the jury’s finding that he intimidated or threatened Proctor.  
Thus, he has waived any such argument.  See Wood v. Milyard, 
566 U.S. 463, 474 (2012); United States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 
724, 727 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[A]rguments not raised in the district 
courts are waived on appeal.”). 
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the Bell trial transcript is not the transcript we are reviewing, 
but as in Bell, “while the evidence may lend itself more 
obviously to the theory that [Tyler] killed Proctor in order to 
prevent her from testifying a few hours later at [David T.’s] 
trial,” the record in Tyler’s trial “also supports the inference 
that [Tyler] believed Proctor was going to continue to 
communicate with the Task Force concerning drug crimes that 
[Tyler] and others had committed.”  Id.  As we held in Tyler I, 
and do so again today, we apply Bell’s reasoning to this record 
and conclude that a reasonable juror could infer Tyler acted 
with an intent to hinder Proctor from communicating with law 
enforcement.  See Tyler I, 164 F.3d at 153 (“We reject Tyler’s 
argument . . . for the same reasons that we rejected the identical 
arguments of Ms. Bell.”).  The fact the evidence “may be 
consistent with multiple possibilities” does not mean the 
verdict fails the “‘bare rationality’ test.”  Caraballo-Rodriguez, 
726 F.3d at 432.   
 
The evidence adduced at Tyler’s third trial is sufficient 
to support an inference that Tyler acted with intent to prevent 
Proctor’s communication with law enforcement.  Proctor’s 
cooperation with law enforcement was well known.  She 
completed controlled drug buys from and testified against 
individuals with close relationships with Tyler: his brother and 
Hodge, a woman with whom he and his brother had lived.  
Even after Proctor stopped making covert purchases, she 
continued to provide information to Detective Fones and Agent 
Diller about, among other things, David T.’s New York drug 
supplier and his trips to Jamaica.   
 
Moreover, Tyler himself was involved with drugs.  The 
jury heard evidence that he used drugs, and was involved in a 
dispute with his brother and Bell about the fact that David T. 
16 
provided him drugs that were meant for Jerome King.  During 
the argument, Bell was heard saying that Tyler had killed 
Proctor to which he retorted, “You don’t know who’s listening.  
You don’t know who hears this.”  App. 935.  Tyler’s retort 
gives rise to an inference that he was concerned about others 
learning about his illegal activities, and “it was reasonable for 
the jury to infer that [Tyler] feared that Proctor’s continued 
cooperation with the Task Force would have resulted in 
additional communications with law enforcement officers 
concerning drug crimes committed by [him], among others, 
and that at least part of [Tyler]’s motivation in killing Proctor 
was to prevent such communications.”10  Bell, 113 F.3d at 
 
10 Relying on United States v. Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909, 
917-18 (3d Cir. 1996), the Dissent reasons that the evidence 
showed “that [Tyler] acted to prevent Proctor’s testimony at 
his brother’s trial or to retaliate for her past informant work,” 
but that “there is no evidence from which a jury could infer that 
he was motivated in any way by a desire to prevent . . . 
Proctor’s future communication with law enforcement.”  
Dissenting Op. at 2-3.  In Stansfield, however, we reasoned 
that evidence of the defendant’s questions to the victim about 
why he had spoken to law enforcement was “sufficient for a 
jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant] 
intended to prevent [the victim’s] future communications with 
law enforcement officials, not merely that he intended to 
retaliate against [him] for past communications,” and that 
“inherent in” pointing a loaded gun at the victim’s throat “and 
asking, in effect, ‘Why did you do it?’ is the implicit message, 
‘Don’t ever do it again.’”  101 F.3d at 917-18.  Evidence of 
Proctor’s past communications to law enforcement about 
David T. and Hodge, together with Tyler’s own illegal 
activities, is sufficient for a rational juror to conclude that Tyler 
17 
1350.  Based on this evidence, a rational juror could have 
found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Tyler killed Proctor, at 
least in part, to prevent her from communicating with law 
enforcement.11  
 
3 
Sufficient evidence also establishes the third element—
that the “offense” about which Proctor would have 
communicated “was actually a federal offense.”  Tyler III, 732 
F.3d at 252 (quoting Stansfield, 101 F.3d at 918).  The jury 
heard that Proctor provided information about the distribution 
of controlled substances, which is a federal crime.  See 21 
 
acted, at least in part, to prevent Proctor’s future 
communications.  
11 The Dissent’s conclusion that “if evidence that 
[Tyler] knew Proctor had previously served as an informant 
was enough to establish the necessary intent, any murder of a 
known informant could become a federal crime,” Dissenting 
Op. at 9, fails to account for the evidence that Tyler resided 
with two of the individuals about whom Proctor was 
communicating to law enforcement, that Tyler was involved 
with drugs, and that shortly after the murder, Tyler argued with 
his brother about receiving drugs meant for someone else.  
Proctor’s known informant status was not the sole evidence 
supporting Tyler’s intent, at least in part, to prevent Proctor’s 
future communications.  Instead, that evidence coupled with 
the evidence about Tyler’s own illegal activities and his close 
relationship to others against whom Proctor had acted as an 
informant provided a basis for a rational juror to conclude that 
Tyler intended to kill Proctor, at least in part, to prevent a law 
enforcement communication.  
18 
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  Indeed, federal authorities in the 
Harrisburg area might have investigated and prosecuted the 
activities about which Proctor had knowledge.  In the 
Harrisburg region, the DEA often made small controlled buys 
to develop federal cases, and federal law does not set a 
minimum amount of controlled substances that must be 
involved for the conduct to violate federal law.     
 
Moreover, Proctor told Detective Fones that David T.’s 
cocaine source was in New York and that he had travelled to 
Jamaica.  This evidence shows that drug offenses about which 
Proctor had knowledge were federal, not “purely state in 
nature.”  Fowler, 563 U.S. at 677; see also United States v. 
Veliz, 800 F.3d 63, 75 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that the offense 
was not “purely state in nature” and that sufficient evidence 
supported a federal nexus under § 1512(b)(3) where defendant 
“committed multiple related crimes across multiple states, with 
multiple accomplices”).  Thus, the evidence was sufficient to 
satisfy the third element. 
 
4 
 
The Government also presented sufficient evidence 
upon which a rational juror could conclude that there was a 
reasonable likelihood that one of Proctor’s communications 
would have been to a qualifying law enforcement officer, 
whether to Agent Diller or to a DEA agent.   
 
To convict a defendant under the investigation-related 
provision of the witness tampering statute, the Government 
must show that the defendant tampered with a witness to 
hinder, delay, or prevent a communication from that witness to 
19 
a qualifying law enforcement officer.12  § 1512(a)(1)(C), 
(b)(3).  To satisfy this element, the Government must prove “a 
reasonable likelihood that, had, e.g., the victim communicated 
with law enforcement officers, at least one relevant 
communication would have been made to a federal law 
enforcement officer.”  Fowler, 563 U.S. at 677 (emphasis 
omitted).  This standard “is a ‘relatively low bar.’”  Bruce, 868 
F.3d at 185 (quoting United States v. Smith, 723 F.3d 510, 518 
(4th Cir. 2013)).  Indeed, to establish reasonable likelihood, 
“[t]he Government need not show that such a communication, 
had it occurred, would have been federal beyond a reasonable 
doubt, nor even that it is more likely than not.”13  Fowler, 563 
U.S. at 678.  Instead, it “must show that the likelihood of 
communication to a federal officer was more than remote, 
outlandish, or simply hypothetical.”  Id.   
 
12 The Government need not prove that the defendant 
knew that the law enforcement officer was federal or acting as 
an advisor or consultant to the federal Government.  
§ 1512(g)(2).  
13 This is because “[t]he Government will already have 
shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed 
the relevant broad indefinite intent, namely, the intent to 
prevent the victim from communicating with (unspecified) law 
enforcement officers.”  Fowler, 563 U.S. at 674.  Thus, “where 
the defendant kills a person with an intent to prevent 
communication with law enforcement officers generally, that 
intent includes an intent to prevent communications 
with federal law enforcement officers only if it is reasonably 
likely under the circumstances that (in the absence of the 
killing) at least one of the relevant communications would have 
been made to a federal officer.”  Id. at 677-78 (emphasis 
omitted).   
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Before examining the proof concerning this element, we 
will address the District Court’s incorrect view that this 
“reasonable likelihood” standard is limited to circumstances 
where the defendant does not have “some specific law 
enforcement officer or set of officers” in mind as the recipient 
of the witness’s communication.  Tyler, 2018 WL 10322201, 
at *12 (quoting Fowler, 563 U.S. at 672) (emphasis omitted).    
 
a 
 
Fowler instructs that the reasonable likelihood standard 
applies “where the defendant does not have particular federal 
law enforcement officers in mind,” so long as “the Government 
. . . show[s] a reasonable likelihood that, had, e.g., the victim 
communicated with law enforcement officers, at least one 
relevant communication would have been made to a federal 
law enforcement officer.”  563 U.S. at 677.  Pursuant to 
Fowler, we held in Tyler III that the “reasonable likelihood” 
standard applied in determining whether Proctor would 
communicate with a qualifying federal officer, not a specific 
person, and directed the District Court to evaluate the evidence 
under this standard.  Tyler III, 732 F.3d at 252-53.  Later, in 
Bruce, we applied the “reasonable likelihood” standard where 
a defendant allegedly prevented witnesses from 
communicating with state law enforcement about a defendant’s 
robbery and arson.  868 F.3d at 175-76, 181.  Applying the 
“reasonable likelihood standard,” id. at 181, we held that the 
Government must prove that there is “a reasonable likelihood 
that the person whom the defendant believes may 
communicate with law enforcement would in fact make a 
relevant communication with a law enforcement officer,” id. at 
184 (emphasis omitted).  We observed that the statute “reaches 
conduct that ‘takes place before the victim has engaged in any 
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communication at all with law enforcement officers—at a time 
when the precise communication and nature of the officer who 
may receive it are not yet known.’”  Id. at 185 (quoting Fowler, 
563 U.S. at 673).14   
 
As in Fowler, evidence was presented that Tyler “killed 
[Proctor] with an intent to prevent [her] from communicating 
with law enforcement officers in general” but that Tyler “did 
not have federal law enforcement officers (or any specific 
individuals) particularly in mind.”  563 U.S. at 670.  Thus, 
Fowler’s “reasonable likelihood” standard applies.15   
 
14 Other Courts of Appeals have applied the “reasonable 
likelihood” standard where there was evidence that witnesses 
had already communicated with a specific law enforcement 
officer.  See, e.g., Dhinsa v. Krueger, 917 F.3d 70, 82-84 (2d 
Cir. 2019) (applying the standard where defendant murdered 
witnesses after one witness started questioning the 
organization’s illegal activities and the other began 
cooperating with state police); United States v. Johnson, 874 
F.3d 1078, 1080-82 (9th Cir. 2017) (applying the standard 
where correctional officer kept his report of a use of force from 
reaching a specific prison sergeant allegedly to prevent the 
report from reaching a federal officer); Smith, 723 F.3d at 512-
14 (applying the standard where defendant allegedly 
firebombed a witness’s house in retaliation for her regular 
reports to local police about drug activity).  
15 Application of the “reasonable likelihood” standard 
may not always be necessary.  Where there is sufficient 
evidence that a defendant intended to prevent a witness from 
communicating with a specific federal law enforcement 
officer, there would be no need to apply the “reasonable 
likelihood” standard to determine whether, had the witness 
22 
b 
Applying the Fowler standard, the record shows that it 
was “reasonably likely” that Proctor would have 
communicated with a “law enforcement officer” as defined 
under § 1515(a)(4)(A).  To satisfy this element, the 
Government must prove two things: (1) it is reasonably likely 
the witness would communicate information and (2) the person 
to whom she would communicate the information would be a 
“law enforcement officer” as defined under § 1515(a)(4)(A).  
The statute defines a “law enforcement officer” as an “officer 
or employee of the Federal Government, or a person . . . serving 
the Federal Government as an adviser or consultant . . . 
authorized under law to engage in or supervise the prevention, 
detection, investigation, or prosecution of an offense.”  
§ 1515(a)(4)(A).  We will examine whether Agent Diller and 
Special Agent Humphreys qualify as § 1515(a)(4)(A) law 
enforcement officers and whether it was reasonably likely that 
Proctor would have communicated with them. 
 
Agent Diller was a qualifying law enforcement officer 
because he advised and consulted with the DEA.  Agent Diller 
coordinated the Task Force, and in that capacity met with the 
DEA frequently.  Agent Diller referred up to ten cases per year 
 
“communicated with [that officer], at least one relevant 
communication would have been made to a federal law 
enforcement officer.”  Fowler, 563 U.S. at 677-78.  This is 
because the statute “fits like a glove” when the defendant has 
a federal law enforcement officer in mind, since it would be 
undisputed that that officer is federal and thus the Government 
would not have to offer additional proof to establish the federal 
nexus.  See id. at 672.   
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to the DEA, often to Special Agent Humphreys.  For certain 
cases the DEA adopted, Agent Diller was deputized as a 
federal agent or served as a co-case agent.  See Bruce, 868 F.3d 
at 186 (observing that state law enforcement officers who 
“participated in the investigation after federal intervention . . . 
would count as federal officers”).  The evidence presented at 
Tyler’s third trial again provided a basis for a rational juror to 
conclude that Agent Diller was a qualifying “law enforcement 
officer” under § 1515(a)(4)(A), as he worked closely with the 
DEA to both personally participate in cases and to advise 
whether a case should be pursued on the federal level.  As we 
have concluded in the past, these facts demonstrate that Agent 
Diller was a “law enforcement officer” under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1515(a)(4).  See Tyler II, 281 F.3d at 99.   
 
 The evidence also showed that it was reasonably likely 
that Proctor would have communicated with Agent Diller.  Part 
of Agent Diller’s role as the Task Force coordinator was to 
interview confidential informants.  Not only did Agent Diller 
meet with Proctor more than ten times, he was also present for 
each of her controlled purchases and debriefed her before and 
after each buy.  Even after the Task Force no longer used her 
to make controlled purchases, Proctor continued to provide 
information to the Task Force.  Over the course of the 
investigation, Proctor also told Detective Fones that David T.’s 
cocaine supplier was in New York and that David T. made trips 
to Jamaica.  Detective Fones relayed this information to Agent 
Diller to determine how it could be used and how Proctor could 
assist.  Given how often Proctor met with Agent Diller, the 
information Proctor had concerning interstate drug activity, 
and the fact that she was continuing to provide information to 
law enforcement, it was far from “remote, outlandish, or 
simply hypothetical”  that she would communicate with him 
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about David T.’s interstate drug connection and that Agent 
Diller would share that information with the DEA.  Fowler, 
563 U.S. at 678. 
 
The jury also heard evidence from which it could 
conclude that Proctor was “reasonably likely” to communicate 
with a DEA agent such as Special Agent Humphreys, who is a 
qualifying law enforcement officer.  Agent Diller and Special 
Agent Humphreys had regular contact.  Among the criteria 
Agent Diller would have considered in determining whether to 
refer a case to the DEA was whether “the source was outside 
Pennsylvania.”  App. 596.  Because the Task Force could only 
investigate crimes occurring in Pennsylvania, and the DEA has 
an interest in pursuing interstate drug activity, a reasonable 
juror could conclude that Proctor’s information about David 
T.’s New York source and trips to Jamaica would have been 
relayed to the DEA.  Special Agent Humphreys testified that 
had Agent Diller approached him with information from a 
confidential informant, it “would be required almost” that 
Special Agent Humphreys would interview the informant.  
App. 670.  From this evidence, a juror could infer that Proctor 
was reasonably likely to communicate with Special Agent 
Humphreys or another DEA agent about the out-of-state drug 
activity.16  See United States v. Johnson, 874 F.3d 1078, 1083 
 
16 The likelihood of such communication is further 
corroborated by how often the DEA and local law enforcement 
worked together.  The jury heard evidence that 65% of the 
investigations that the Harrisburg DEA office initiated from 
1984 to 1996, were worked jointly with state and local law 
enforcement.  Over 50% of the time, the DEA worked with 
informants obtained from state and local task forces.  
Furthermore, federal authorities regularly prosecuted cases 
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(9th Cir. 2017) (suggesting that the reasonable likelihood 
standard would be fulfilled by evidence that federal officials 
were in contact with the county jail, had a policy or practice of 
investigating similar incidents, or assisted or shared 
information with state and local officials); Aguero v. United 
States, 580 F. App’x 748, 753 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) 
(holding, in a police-related shooting, the reasonable likelihood 
standard satisfied where police had a working relationship with 
the federal government, investigations occurred after each 
police shooting, and there was a standard practice of 
forwarding information from shootings to the FBI); Smith, 723 
F.3d at 518 (holding the reasonable likelihood standard 
satisfied where victim complained of gang activity and drug 
trafficking, and evidence showed that the DEA worked closely 
with the city police and that the police were its “biggest source 
of information”).  Therefore, a rational juror had a basis to 
conclude it was reasonably likely that Proctor would have 
spoken to a qualifying law enforcement officer and that Tyler 
murdered or aided in her murder to prevent her from doing so.17 
 
involving small amounts of drugs, and such cases were often 
of interest even without evidence of an interstate source.       
17 We will also affirm the order denying Tyler’s motion 
to dismiss his § 924(c) conviction.  Tyler contends that because 
the commission of an underlying predicate is a necessary 
element of a § 924(c) conviction, and because this Court 
vacated his predicate witness tampering charges, dismissal of 
his § 924(c) conviction was required.    
Tyler’s argument fails for two reasons.  First, because 
we direct the reinstatement of his witness tampering 
convictions, the basis for Tyler’s argument challenging his 
§ 924(c) conviction evaporates.  Second, and in any event, our 
precedent forecloses Tyler’s argument.  A conviction under 
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III 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s order granting Tyler’s motion for judgment of acquittal 
on the witness tampering charges, direct that the jury’s verdict 
be reinstated, affirm the judgment on the firearms conviction, 
and remand for sentencing.  
 
§ 924(c) “requires that the government prove the defendant 
committed a qualifying offense but does not require that the 
defendant be charged or convicted of such an offense.”  United 
States v. Galati, 844 F.3d 152, 155 (3d Cir. 2016); see also 
United States v. Haywood, 363 F.3d 200, 211 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(holding that § 924(c) “requires only that the defendant have 
committed a violent crime for which he may be prosecuted in 
federal court” and “does not even require that the crime be 
charged; a fortiori, it does not require that he be convicted” 
(emphasis and citations omitted)). 
 1 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part: 
 
I disagree with the Majority on one essential issue—
Willie Tyler’s intent.  Judge Jones, an experienced trial judge, 
vacated the jury’s verdict based on this issue, concluding that 
it was mere speculation that Willie acted with the intent to 
prevent Proctor from communicating with law enforcement.  I 
was initially skeptical that this rejection of the jury’s verdict 
was warranted, but upon further reflection have come to 
believe that it was entirely correct.  Judge Jones stated:  
 
Based on the evidence presented, an inference 
that Willie acted with the distinct intent to 
prevent an investigation-related communication 
is far too speculative to withstand judicial 
review.  At the end of the day, it is clear that 
Proctor was murdered because she was going to 
testify the next morning against [David] Tyler.  
Though an atrocious crime, it is one that falls 
under the purview of state charges unless the 
evidence can satisfy the specific intent element 
that brings it under the ambit of the federal 
witness tampering statute.  Even in the face of 
the incredibly high standard of review for a Rule 
29 post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal, 
we cannot hold that this evidence was sufficient 
to support any rational trier of fact to find guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt for this element.  This 
finding of intent was a necessary element for 
each of Willie’s convictions under § 1512.  We 
therefore must grant the Motion on this basis and 
vacate both of his convictions. 
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App. 29.   
 Noting the importance of evidence of such intent to 
federalize an otherwise state crime, Judge Jones observed that 
finding the evidence here sufficient “would essentially 
eviscerate any intent requirement at all and would allow federal 
witness tampering convictions against virtually all homicides 
of state and local police informants.”  Id.  The federal statute 
has two distinct elements.  The Government need only 
establish that there is a reasonable likelihood that any alleged 
communication would be made to a qualifying federal officer.  
That bar is quite low.  The low bar of that element stands in 
contrast to the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for 
the element of intent to prevent a communication.  In fact, the 
Supreme Court found the low threshold of the reasonable 
likelihood standard permissible precisely because “[t]he 
Government will already have shown beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant possessed the relevant broad 
indefinite intent, namely, the intent to prevent the victim from 
communicating with (unspecified) law enforcement.”  Fowler 
v. United States, 563 U.S. 668, 674 (2011) (emphasis added).  
The Supreme Court has cautioned against “bring[ing] within 
the scope of [§ 1512] many instances of witness tampering in 
purely state investigations and proceedings, thus extending the 
scope of this federal statute well beyond the primarily federal 
area that Congress had in mind.”  Id. at 675.  We would engage 
in just this sort of expansion of the statute if we were to allow 
a conviction to stand where the evidence cannot establish 
beyond a reasonable doubt the intent element necessary to 
make the offense a federal crime.  
 
In order to convict Willie Tyler, the jury had to find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted with intent to prevent 
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Doreen Proctor from communicating information to law 
enforcement.  Importantly, the intent to prevent a 
communication differs from the intent to prevent a person’s 
appearance in an official proceeding, which is an element of 
separate 18 U.S.C. § 1512 offenses, see 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1512(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B), (b)(1), (b)(2),1 and from the intent 
to retaliate for past communications with law enforcement.  
See United States v. Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909, 917–18 (3d Cir. 
1996), abrogated in part by Fowler, 563 U.S. 668.  While there 
is little doubt that the evidence demonstrated that Willie acted 
to prevent Proctor’s testimony at his brother’s trial or to 
retaliate for her past informant work, there is no evidence from 
which a jury could infer that he was motivated in any way by 
a desire to prevent Doreen Proctor’s future communication 
with law enforcement.2 
 
1 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Arthur Andersen 
LLP v. United States, the evidence in this case could not 
establish guilt under § 1512’s official proceeding provisions, 
which require a nexus between the alleged conduct and a 
federal proceeding.  United States v. Tyler (Tyler III), 732 F.3d 
241, 245, 250–51 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Arthur Andersen LLP 
v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 707–08 (2005)).  The official 
proceeding charges therefore were not advanced at the trial 
below.  
2 As the Majority points out, in Stansfield, we held that the 
evidence was “sufficient for a jury to conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that [the defendant] intended to prevent [the 
victim’s] future communications with law enforcement 
officials, not merely that he intended to retaliate against [him] 
for past communications.”  Id.  We reasoned that the 
defendant’s questions to the victim about why he had spoken 
to law enforcement demonstrated the necessary intent because 
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The narrative that played out at Willie Tyler’s trial—
perhaps unlike evidence at previous trials—had very little to 
do with Willie Tyler.  He was a peripheral player, while the 
evidence focused on Doreen Proctor and her relationships with 
David Tyler’s cronies and with law enforcement.  Willie’s only 
drug activities were that he used to get high with Gwanda 
Campbell and, after the murder, his brother made Roberta Bell 
angry by giving Willie drugs.  Much was made of Doreen 
Proctor’s role in the state, and potentially federal, 
investigations and trials in order to satisfy the necessary 
element of a reasonable likelihood that, if she did make a 
communication to law enforcement, it would have been to a 
federal officer.  The nature of her continued role was disputed, 
but it was never even urged that Willie knew of any such 
ongoing role, let alone that he had reason to care about or fear 
any future communication by her.  In most cases in which the 
 
“inherent in . . . asking, in effect, ‘Why did you do it?’” while 
pointing a loaded gun at the victim’s throat “is the implicit 
message, ‘Don’t ever do it again.’”  Id. at 918.  In Stansfield, 
the defendant knew the victim had been communicating 
information to law enforcement regarding a pending 
investigation into the defendant’s insurance fraud scheme.  Id. 
at 911.  The facts in Stansfield showed that the defendant was 
not merely retaliating for cooperation in a past investigation 
but attempting to prevent communication that would further 
law enforcement’s ongoing investigation into his own illegal 
activity.  Here, there was no investigation into Willie Tyler’s 
activities, and no evidence that Willie Tyler knew of any 
ongoing investigation into his friends.  I therefore disagree 
with the Majority’s suggestion that the facts in Stansfield are 
analogous to the facts before us.  See Maj. Op. at 16 n.10. 
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element of intent to prevent an investigation-related 
communication can be inferred, it is clear that the perpetrator 
had reason to fear that, had the victim lived, he or she would 
have gone to the police to tell them of the perpetrator’s 
activities.3  Here, there was no speculation, let alone evidence, 
 
3 Indeed, in each of the cases on which the Majority relies, the 
perpetrator had a clear reason to want to prevent the victim’s 
communication with law enforcement, most often the victim’s 
knowledge of the defendant’s own criminal activity.  See 
Fowler, 563 U.S. at 670 (defendant killed officer who 
witnessed defendant and others planning a robbery); Dhinsa v. 
Krueger, 917 F.3d 70, 82–83 (2d Cir. 2019) (defendant ordered 
murders of witnesses who confronted associates about 
defendant’s racketeering organization or cooperated with 
police investigation into defendant’s illegal activities); Bruce 
v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 868 F.3d 170, 175–76 (3d Cir. 
2017) (defendant killed owner of the business he robbed, along 
with owner’s fiancée who was present); United States v. Veliz, 
800 F.3d 63, 67–68 (2d Cir. 2015) (defendant solicited murder 
of co-conspirator whom he feared would talk to police about 
defendant’s role in two murders); Aguero v. United States, 580 
F. App’x 748, 753 (11th Cir. 2014) (defendant, a police officer, 
planted weapons at scenes of shootings in which he was 
involved and provided misleading statements to investigators 
who would relay information to federal law enforcement); 
United States v. Smith, 723 F.3d 510, 512 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(defendant, a gang leader, orchestrated an attack on a witness 
who was communicating with police on a near-daily basis 
about the gang’s drug activity in her neighborhood); Stansfield, 
101 F.3d at 917–18 (defendant killed witness who was sharing 
information with law enforcement about defendant’s insurance 
fraud scheme); see also United States v. Johnson, 874 F.3d 
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that Doreen Proctor posed any threat at all to Willie, or that 
Willie knew of any such threat to himself or others.  Allowing 
the jury to infer that Proctor would have a future role in a 
federal investigation is a far cry from allowing them to 
conclude that Willie Tyler knew this and acted with an intent 
to prevent it.  
 
If Willie was portrayed as part of David’s group, 
perhaps the result would be different.  But Willie was not a 
drug dealer, and he had to be asked by his brother if he knew 
how to cock a gun.  At one point, he had to be told his brother 
was in town, and at the time of the murder, when he asked his 
brother what was going on, he was told that it was not his 
business.  The most damning evidence of Willie’s involvement 
was his accompanying his brother to the murder, his 
declaration that “the bitch is gone” or “she’s gone” the 
following morning, App. 507, 514, and Bell’s statement, 
purportedly to Willie, that “you killed her,” App. 935.  But, 
again, that proves nothing as to his fear of Proctor’s 
prospective communications, only his desire that she not be 
alive to testify against his brother.  
 
The intent element requires a showing that the 
defendant “was motivated by a desire to prevent the 
communication” between the victim and law enforcement.  
Stansfield, 101 F.3d at 918.  Such motivation is impossible 
 
1078, 1079–80, 1083 (9th Cir. 2017) (defendant allegedly 
withheld information from supervisor about an assault in 
which defendant was purportedly involved, but evidence was 
insufficient to demonstrate reasonable likelihood of 
communication to a federal officer); see also United States v. 
Bell, 113 F.3d 1345, 1350 (3d Cir. 1997) discussed infra. 
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unless the defendant knew or believed that the victim would, 
in fact, communicate with law enforcement.  See United States 
v. Kozak, 438 F.2d 1062, 1065–66 (3d Cir. 1971).  There is 
simply no evidence from which this intent on Willie’s part can 
be inferred.  At most, there is evidence to allow two inferences: 
(a) Willie knew that Proctor had provided information about 
his brother and others, that she had testified against Hodge, and 
that she was going to testify the next morning against his 
brother; and (b) Proctor had continued to communicate 
information to Detective Fones despite the apparent end to the 
investigation.  Lacking, however, is evidence that Willie knew 
or believed Proctor was going to have any future 
communication with law enforcement or acted to prevent it.4   
 
4 If anything, the evidence shows that Willie had reason to 
believe Proctor was finished working as an informant.  Proctor 
testified publicly at Hodge’s trial that she was “out of this 
business.”  App. 462.  There is no suggestion in her 
testimony—of which the Government asks us to assume Willie 
was aware—that she still worked with law enforcement.  
Further, the preliminary hearings, where Proctor’s identity as 
an informant was revealed, occurred in late July and early 
August 1991, but the murder did not occur until April 1992, 
after Proctor had testified against Hodge and just before she 
was expected to testify against David Tyler.  Although the 
timing shows that Willie and others sought to prevent the 
testimony against David, it cuts against the idea that they 
wanted to prevent investigation-related communications by 
Proctor.  Such a motive would have warranted earlier timing of 
the murder to prevent law enforcement building a case against 
Hodge and David.  By the time of the murder, the evidence 
indicates that, from Willie Tyler’s perspective, Doreen Proctor 
was a trial witness who was done serving as an informant. 
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The evidence similarly fails to support the Majority’s 
inference that Willie Tyler sought to prevent Proctor from 
communicating with law enforcement about his own drug 
activity.  Nothing in the record suggests that Willie knew 
Proctor or was familiar with her other than through her 
testimony against his brother and Hodge.  The record thus 
contains zero evidence that Proctor knew about any drug 
activity in which Willie was involved.  The only evidence of 
Willie engaging in drug activity at all before Proctor’s death is 
Campbell’s testimony that she “used to get high with him.”  
App. 484.  There is no evidence that Proctor was present for or 
aware of this drug use or that Willie believed she knew about 
it.  The same can be said of Willie’s receipt of drugs from his 
brother after Proctor’s death, when Proctor could neither have 
known nor communicated about the drug possession.  Given 
the lack of evidence that Willie Tyler had anything to fear from 
Proctor’s communications to law enforcement, it would be 
irrational to conclude on this record that his participation in 
Proctor’s murder was motivated by a desire to prevent such 
communications.  
 
The Majority makes much of Willie’s response to Bell’s 
statement that he killed Proctor, suggesting that his reaction 
“gives rise to an inference that he was concerned about others 
learning about his illegal activities.”  Maj. Op. at 16.  In 
response to Bell saying, about Proctor, “you killed her,” Willie 
said, “You don’t know who’s listening.  You don’t know who 
hears this.”  App. 935.  This certainly gives rise to an inference 
that Willie was concerned about others learning of his 
involvement in Proctor’s murder, but no greater inference 
follows from the exchange.  Notably, Willie did not try to 
silence Bell during the preceding argument that revealed his 
possession of unlawful drugs.  Willie’s response to the murder 
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accusation does not show that he believed Proctor had 
continued to cooperate with the Task Force or had any 
information about drug crimes committed by him.  One 
therefore cannot rationally infer from Willie’s exchange with 
Bell that he “feared that Proctor’s continued cooperation with 
the Task Force would have resulted in additional 
communications with law enforcement officers concerning 
drug crimes committed by [him]” and that such a fear 
motivated the killing.  Maj. Op. at 16 (alteration in original) 
(quoting United States v. Bell, 113 F.3d 1345, 1350 (3d Cir. 
1997)).   
 
The Majority makes that inference largely by importing 
our analysis from United States v. Bell, but the factual records 
of the two cases differ in dispositive ways.5  In Bell, we found 
that “it was reasonable for the jury to infer that Bell feared that 
Proctor’s continued cooperation with the Task Force would 
have resulted in additional communications with law 
enforcement officers concerning drug crimes committed by 
 
5 The Majority contends otherwise, claiming that we applied 
the Bell reasoning in Willie Tyler’s first direct appeal and 
should do so here.  Maj. Op. at 15.  I disagree.  In Tyler I, we 
rejected Willie “Tyler’s argument that the evidence did not 
establish federal jurisdiction under [18 U.S.C. § 1512] for the 
same reasons that we rejected the identical arguments of Ms. 
Bell.”  United States v. Tyler (Tyler I), 164 F.3d 150, 153 (3d 
Cir. 1998).  We did not discuss Willie’s sufficiency of the 
evidence arguments, and we did not describe the evidence 
introduced at the trial at all.  In my view, our scant reasoning 
in Tyler I does not provide a basis from which we can conclude 
that Bell’s reasoning with respect to intent to prevent a 
communication should apply to the record before us.  
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Bell.”  113 F.3d at 1350.  We reached that conclusion based in 
part on evidence that Bell was involved in the drug trade with 
David Tyler, about whom Proctor had provided information 
and against whom she planned to testify.  Id.6  The evidence in 
Bell showed that “Bell was personally and heavily involved” 
in the drug trade in Carlisle and Harrisburg about which 
Proctor had provided information.  Id.  Indeed, we noted that 
there was “evidence that Bell was at least as heavily implicated 
as [David] Tyler in the drug trade for which Tyler was on trial.”  
Id.  Even on the current record in Willie’s case, we have 
evidence that Bell engaged in drug distribution and specifically 
distributed drugs to Proctor.  Bell knew that Proctor had 
information about her that Bell would not want communicated 
to law enforcement.  In contrast, the evidence presented at 
Willie’s trial offered no reason to believe Willie was involved 
in his brother’s drug trade, knew Proctor, or had reason to 
 
6 Our emphasis in Bell on Bell’s involvement in the drug trade 
was consistent with our case law, which has held evidence 
sufficient to support a conviction for witness tampering with 
intent to prevent a communication under § 1512 when the 
defendant was the subject of the information he feared the 
victim would communicate.  See, e.g., Stansfield, 101 F.3d at 
917–19 (holding evidence sufficient where defendant sought to 
prevent informant from communicating information about 
defendant’s insurance fraud scheme).  Even the Government 
argues that the implication that an informant was murdered to 
prevent a communication with law enforcement arises “[i]f a 
known informant is murdered by the subjects of her 
information.”  Appellant’s Br. at 33 (emphasis added).  Here, 
there is no evidence that Willie Tyler would have been the 
subject of any information Proctor possessed.  
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believe she had information about him.  Unlike Bell, Willie had 
nothing to fear from Proctor’s potential communications with 
law enforcement that would allow us to infer a motive to 
prevent them.7 
 
We also cannot rationally infer from knowledge of 
Proctor’s past informant activities and plans to testify in state 
court proceedings that Willie sought to prevent Proctor’s future 
communications with law enforcement.  Rational inferences 
require “a logical and convincing connection between the facts 
established and the conclusion inferred.”  United States v. 
Bycer, 593 F.2d 549, 550 (3d Cir. 1979).  Here, the admittedly 
rational inference that Willie knew of Proctor’s past informant 
activities concerning his brother and associates does not 
logically or convincingly lead to the further conclusions that 
Willie believed Proctor had additional information, believed 
she would continue to communicate with law enforcement 
months after the investigation had apparently ended, and acted 
to prevent such communications.  Those inferences are not 
rational and would not allow a jury to conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Willie intended to prevent Proctor’s 
future communications.  
 
 
7 The Majority emphasizes Willie’s “illegal activities” as 
evidence of his intent to prevent Proctor from communicating 
with law enforcement.  Maj. Op. at 16, 16 n.10, 17 n.11.  But, 
as discussed supra, the only illegal activity that could have 
contributed to his intent to participate in the murder was his 
personal drug use, and there is no evidence that Proctor knew 
anything about that use.  Such illicit use is a far cry from Bell’s 
heavy involvement in David Tyler’s drug trade.  See Bell, 113 
F.3d at 1350. 
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As the District Court noted, if evidence that Willie knew 
Proctor had previously served as an informant was enough to 
establish the necessary intent, any murder of a known 
informant could become a federal crime.  That approach would 
allow the Government to circumvent the federal nexus 
requirement of the official proceeding provisions, permitting 
federal prosecution of a murder intended only to prevent state 
court testimony.  The District Court was correct in vacating 
Willie Tyler’s conviction due to the absence of proof necessary 
for the jury to find the essential element of intent.  I therefore 
respectfully dissent and would affirm.8 
 
8 I concur in the judgment as to Willie Tyler’s cross appeal, 
case number 17-2613.  Although I would not find the basis for 
the appeal moot, I agree with the Majority that our precedent 
forecloses his argument.  
